I. INTRODUCTION

I
N the digital world today, as the rapid progress of multimedia and network technologies, the security of digital images becomes more and more important, since the communications of digital products over networks occur more and more frequently. Furthermore, special and reliable security in storage and transmission of digital images is needed in many applications, such as pay-TV, medical imaging systems, military image database and communications as well as confidential video conferencing, etc. In recent years, some consumer electronic devices, especially mobile phones and hand-held devices, have also started to provide the function Shujun Li and Guanrong Chen are with the Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Toon, Hong Kong SAR, P. R. China. E-mails: hooklee@mail.com, gchen@ee.cityu.edu.hk.
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To meet the challenges arising from different applications, good encryption of digital images is necessary. The simplest way to encrypt an image is to consider the 2-D image stream as a 1-D data stream, and then encrypt this 1-D stream with any available cipher [1] . Although such a simple way is sufficient to protect digital images in some civil applications, encryption schemes considering special features of digital images, such as the bulky size and the large redundancy in uncompressed images, are still needed to provide better overall performance and make the adoption of the encryption scheme easier in the whole image processing system. For a more thorough discussion on the problems of the naive use of text ciphers for digital images, see Sec. 4.2.2 of [2] .
Since the 1990s, many specific algorithms have been proposed, aiming to provide better solutions to image encryption [3] - [18] . At the same time, cryptanalytic work on proposed image encryption schemes has also been developed, and some existing schemes have been found to be insecure from the cryptographical point of view [19] - [26] . Due to the tight relationship between chaos and cryptography [25, Chap. 2] , chaotic systems have been widely used in image encryption to realize diffusion and confusion in a good cipher [10] - [18] . The present paper focuses on a new chaos-based image encryption scheme proposed by Chen and Yen in [17] , [18] , which was originally called RSES (random seed encryption system) in [17] and then renamed to be RCES (random control encryption system) in [18] . RCES is actually an enhanced version of a previously-proposed image encryption scheme called CKBA (chaotic key-based algorithm) [16] , which has been cryptanalyzed in [24] . The present paper evaluates the security of RCES, and points out that RCES is as weak as CKBA: only one or two known/chosen plain-images are enough to break it.
In addition, it will be shown that the security of RCES against brute-force attack was much overestimated.
Due to the special design of RCES, some essential security defects existing in it are very useful for revealing several design principles in a secure image encryption scheme. This magnifies the significance of RCES and also its negative aspects in the cryptanalysis presented below. This paper is organized as follows. For convenience, some preliminary knowledge of cryptanalytic techniques is firstly given in Sec. II. Section III briefly introduces RCES and its parent version CKBA. A detailed cryptanalysis of RCES is presented in Sec. IV, where some experimental results are given to support the theoretical analysis. Section V discusses some design principles drawn from the essential security defects of RCES. The last section concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF CRYPTANALYSIS
To facilitate the following discussion, this section gives a brief introduction to the basic theory of modern cryptology [27] . Cryptology, the technology of encryption, is composed of two parts: cryptography and cryptanalysis. The former studies how to design good encryption algorithms, and the latter tries to find security weaknesses of proposed algorithms and studies whether or not they are vulnerable to some attacks.
An encryption system is also called a cipher, or a cryptosystem. The message for encryption is called plaintext, and the encrypted message is called ciphertext. Denote the plaintext and the ciphertext by P and C, respectively. The encryption procedure of a cipher can be described as C = E Ke (P ), where K e is the encryption key and E(·) is the encryption function.
Similarly, the decryption procedure is P = D K d (C), where K d is the decryption key and D(·) is the decryption function.
When K e = K d , the cipher is called a private-key cipher or a symmetric cipher. For private-key ciphers, the encryptiondecryption key must be transmitted from the sender to the receiver via a separate secret channel. When K e = K d , the cipher is called a public-key cipher or a asymmetric cipher. For public-key ciphers, the encryption key K e is published, and the decryption key K d is kept private, for which no additional secret channel is needed for key transfer.
E n c r y p t i o n P l a i n t e x t K e C i p h e r t e x t D e c r y p t i o n
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P u b l i c c h a n n e l Fig. 1 . The encryption and decryption of a cipher Following Kerckhoff's principle widely acknowledged in the cryptology community [27] , the security of a cipher only relies on the decryption key K d , and it is assumed that all details of the encryption/decryption procedure are known to attackers. Thus, the main task of cryptanalysis is to reconstruct the key, or its equivalent form that can successfully decrypt all or part of the plaintexts.
A cryptographically strong cipher should be secure enough against all kinds of attacks. For most ciphers, the following four attacks under different scenarios should be checked:
• the ciphertext-only attack -attackers can only observe some ciphertexts;
• the known-plaintext attack -attackers can get some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts;
• the chosen-plaintext attack -attackers can choose some plaintexts and get the corresponding ciphertexts;
• the chosen-ciphertext attack -attackers can choose some ciphertexts and get the corresponding plaintexts.
The last two attacks, which seem to seldom occur in practice, are feasible in some real applications [27, Sec. 1.1.7] and they become more and more common in the digital world today.
As surveyed in [2] , it is known that many image/video encryption schemes are not secure enough against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. This paper shows that RCES is also insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
III. INTRODUCTION TO RCES
A. CKBA [16] -The Parent Version of RCES
Assume that the size of the plain-image for encryption is M × N , CKBA can be described as follows.
1) The secret key: two bytes key1, key2, and the initial condition x(0) ∈ (0, 1) of the following chaotic Logistic map:
which is a well-studied chaotic system in chaos theory and behaves chaotically when µ > 3.5699 · · · [28] .
2) Initialization: run the chaotic system to generate a chaotic sequence,
, where a denotes the smallest integer that is not less than a. From the 16-bit binary representation of
, derive a pseudo-random binary sequence
determined by the following rule:
where B(x, y) = 2 × b(x × N + y) + b(x × N + y + 1), and ⊕ and denote XOR and XNOR operations, respectively. Since
4) Decryption: the decryption procedure is like that of the encryption, since ⊕ is an involutive operation.
5) A constraint:
because not all values of key1 and key2
can make well-disorderly cipher-images, it is required that key1 and key2 have 4 different bits (a half of all). In fact, this constraint ensures that the encryption results of key1 and key2 are sufficiently far.
In [24] , CKBA was cryptanalyzed and the following facts were pointed out:
• the security of CKBA against the brute-force attack was over-estimated;
• CKBA is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks, since only one known/chosen plain-image is enough to get an equivalent key, a mask image f m , by
XORing the plain-image f and the cipher-image f , pixel
• it is easy to reconstruct the whole secret key {key1, key2, x(0)} from the mask image f m , for which the required complexity is rather small.
Apparently, the insecurity of CKBA against known/chosenplaintext attacks is determined by the fact that f (x, y) ⊕ f (x, y) is fixed to be one of the four values, key1, key1, key2, key2, at any given position (x, y). In fact, for any plainimages, f 1 , f 2 and their cipher-images, f 1 , f 2 , one has
for any position (x, y). As a result, given any cipher-image f , the plain-image can be decrypted as follows: f = f ⊕ f m .
B. RCES [18] (or RSES [17])
RCES is an enhanced version of CKBA, by making key1 as a 1-D pixel-sequence
by scanning it line by line from bottom to top.
The plain-image can be divided into M N/16 blocks:
For the k-th pixel-block f (16) (k), the work mechanism of RCES can be described as follows.
1) The secret key: the control parameter µ and the initial condition x(0) of the Logistic map (1). . Note that the Logistic map is realized in 24-bit fixed-point arithmetic.
2) Initialization
3) Encryption: two pseudo-random seeds,
are calculated to encrypt the current plain-block with the following two steps:
a) Pseudo-randomly swapping adjacent pixels:
b) Masking the current plain-block with the two pseudorandom seeds:
where
and
4) Decryption:
The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption procedure, but the masking operation is exerted before the swapping for each pixel-block.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF RCES
Although RCES is much more complicated than CKBA, as analyzed below, its security is not really enhanced by the introduced design complexity.
In this section, the following results are obtained on the security of RCES: 1) its security against brute-force attack was over-estimated; 2) it is not secure against known/chosen- [17] , [18] . Apparently, the security of RCES against the brute-force attack was over-estimated by too much.
B. Known-Plaintext Attack 1: Breaking RCES with a Mask
Image f m Although different seeds are used for pixels at different positions and pseudo-random swapping operations are exerted on the plain-image before masking, the known-plaintext attack breaking CKBA can be efficiently extended to break RCES.
With only one known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image, it is very easy to get a mask image f m , which can be used as an equivalent key of the secret key (µ, x(0))
to decrypt any cipher-image whose size is not larger than the size of f m . When two or more plain-images are known, a swapping matrix Q can be constructed to enhance the breaking performance of the mask image f m . 
1) Get
With the mask image f m , the attacker tries to recover the plain-image by XORing the mask image and the cipher-image pixel by pixel:
is generally not true. Assume that the bit b(24k
Eq. (6) (Fig. 4a) , the mask image f m is used to recover it from its cipher-image f Peppers (Fig. 4b ).
The recovered plain-image f * Lenna = f m ⊕ f Peppers and the difference image f * Peppers − f Peppers are shown in Fig. 5a and 5b, respectively. It is surprisingly seen that the decryption performance is much better than expected: most (much more than 50%) pixels are successfully recovered, and almost all subtle details remain.
Although the difference f * Peppers − f Peppers visually 1 Strictly speaking, the Logistic map cannot guarantee the balance of each generated bit, since its variant density function is not uniform [29] . In this paper, without loss of generality, it is taken for granted so as to simplify the theoretical analyses. shows that most plain-pixels are exactly recovered, statistical data show that 33,834 pixels in f * Peppers − f Peppers are not zero, i.e., about 51.63% of pixels are not exactly recovered.
To explain why f m is so effective to recover most pixels of the plain-image with only half exactly-recovered pixels, consider two pixels in the known plain-image, f (2i), f (2i+1), and their cipher-pixels, f (2i), f (2i + 1), where i = 0 ∼ M N/2 − 1.
Then, the corresponding elements of the two pixels in the mask
. Since all recovery errors are introduced at the positions where the adjacent plain-pixels are swapped, one can theoretically study the recovery performance of the mask image f m by considering the elements corresponding to the swapped pixels only. Assume that f (2i) and f (2i + 1) are swapped in the encryption procedure,
Consider a cipher-image f 1 and its corresponding plainimage f 1 . Assuming that the plain-image recovered from f m is f * 1 , the recovered plain-pixels, f * 1 (2i) and f * 1 (2i+1), satisfy the following propositions and corollaries, respectively.
Then, one has
In a similar way, one can get f *
Thus, the proof is completed.
Proof: This proposition can be proved in a way similar to the proof of the above proposition.
The results of this corollary are special cases of the above two propositions with f (⊕) (2i) = 0.
Based on the above propositions, one can get an upper bound of the recovery errors |f * 1 (2i) − f 1 (2i)| and |f * 1 (2i + 1) − f 1 (2i + 1)|. Firstly, a lemma should be introduced.
Proof: Represent c in the following binary form:
Similarly, represent a and b as follows:
The lemma is thus proved.
This corollary is an obvious result of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Corollary 2 says that the recovery errors of both f * 1 (2i) and f * 1 (2i + 1) will not be larger than
. Due to the strong correlation between adjacent pixels of digital images, the distribution of the difference between two adjacent pixels is Gaussian-like. As a result, f (⊕) (2i) will also obeys a (positive) single-side Gaussian-like distribution, which means that the recovery error of each plain-pixel recovered from f m will also obey a Gaussian-like distribution. The Gaussianlike distribution of recovery errors actually implies that most recovered pixels are close to the real values of the original plain-pixels. Therefore, the surprising recovery performance of f m shown in Fig. 5 can be naturally explained.
For the plain-image f Peppers , the histograms of some differential images are plotted to verify the above-mentioned theoretical results. Define two (M −1)×N differential images
where Since all recovery errors are introduced by swapped pixels, the recovery performance will be better if some swapped pixels can be distinguished. In the following, it is shown that an attacker can manage to do so by manually detecting visible noises in cipher-images, and by intersecting multiple mask images generated from different known plain-images. Fig. 5a , one can find many distinguishable noises by naked eyes, which correspond to the strong edges of the known plain-image f Lenna (see Fig. 5b ). . With the swapping matrix, the mask image f m is amended as follows: • use f m to XOR the cipher-image to get an initial recovered plain-image f * ;
2) Amending
swap the two adjacent pixels f * (2i) and f * (2i + 1).
If an attacker can get more cipher-images encrypted with the same key, he can distinguish more swapped pixels, and gets better recovery performance with f m and Q. This implies that more and more knowledge on how to purify the attack can be learned from the cipher-images, which is a very interesting and useful feature from an attacker's point of view. 
m (l), it can be asserted that the pixel at this position is swapped. Therefore, by comparing the elements of n mask images, some positions corresponding to the swapped pixels can be distinguished. With the swapping information, following the same way described above, a swapping matrix Q can be constructed, and then f m is amended with Q with the way mentioned above. Using the amended f m and the swapping matrix Q, the cipher-image is decrypted with XOR and swapping operations.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), the probability of f
, where l = 2i or 2i + 1. Assume the n mask images are independent of each other and the value of each element distributes uniformly over {0, · · · , 255}. The probability of f
996. This means that only two mask images are enough to distinguish almost all swapped pixels. However, since the mask images are generally not independent of each other and f m (l) does not obey uniform distribution, the real probability will be less than 1 − 256 −1 . Fortunately, for most natural images, this probability is still sufficiently close to 1 − 256 −1 , so that two known plain-images are still enough to distinguish most swapped pixels. Given two known plainimages, 'Lenna' (see Fig. 2a ) and 'Babarra' (see Fig. 8a ), the recovery performance of the attack to 'Peppers' is shown in Fig. 8b . It can be seen that the recovered plain-image is almost perfect, and only 952 (about 1.45% of all) pixels are not exactly recovered.
4) Enhancing the Recovered Plain-Image with Image Processing Techniques:
To further improve the visual quality of the recovered plain-images, some noise reducing techniques can be used to further reduce the recovery errors. For the recovered plain-image f * Lenna in Fig. 5a , the enhanced plainimage f * Lenna with a 3 × 3 median filter and the corresponding difference image f * Peppers − f Peppers are shown in Fig. 9a and 9b, respectively. It can be seen that the visual quality of 
C. Known-Plaintext Attack 2: Breaking the Chaotic Map
In the above-discussed attack based on mask images, assuming that the size of f m is M × N , it is obvious that only M ×N leading pixels in a larger cipher-image can be recovered with f m (and perhaps Q). To decrypt more pixels, the secret control parameter µ and a chaotic state x(k) occurring before
x(M N/16 − 1) have to be known, so that one can calculate more chaotic states after x(M N/16 − 1). That is, the chaotic map should be found. Actually, it is possible for an attacker to achieve this goal with a high probability and a sufficiently small complexity, even when only one plain-image is known.
Similarly, the more the number of known plain-images are, the closer the probability will be to 1, the smaller the value of k will be, and the lower the attack complexity will be.
1) Guessing a Chaotic State x(k) from f m :
In the k-th pixel-block, for any unswapped pixel f (16k + j),
which must be one value in the set
Therefore, if there are enough unswapped pixels, the right values of Seed1(k) and Seed2(k) can be guessed by enumerating all 2-value and 1-value 2 combinations of f m (16k + 0) ∼ f m (16k + 15). To eliminate most wrong values of Seed1(k), Seed2(k), the following requirements are useful:
• both B(k, j) and (Seed1(k), Seed2(k)) are generated with {b(24k + j} 15 j=0 ;
• Seed(16k + j) is uniquely determined by B(k, j) and
For each guessed values passing the above requirements, the corresponding chaotic state
) is derived as follows:
• reconstruct {b(24k + 16 + i)} Note that some extra errors will be introduced in the least 8 bits {b(24k + 16 + i)} 7 i=0 , which makes the derived chaotic state x(k) incorrect. Apparently, the errors are induced by the swapped pixels that correspond to the elements of f m in S 4 . In the following, the probability of such errors, p se = P rob [f m (l) ∈ S 4 ], is studied. For any swapped pixel f (l) in the k-th pixel-block (l = 16k + 0 ∼ 16k + 15), one has
where f (⊕) (l) = f (2 l/2 ) ⊕ f (2 l/2 + 1) and
Considering the Gaussian-like distribution of f (⊕) (see Fig. 6 ) and the fact that 0 ∈ S
4 , p se is generally not negligible for 2 The 1-value combinations are included since Seed1(k) = Seed2(k) may occur with a small probability. Considering the Gaussian-like distribution of f (⊕) (see Fig. 6 ) and 0 ∈ S (⊕) 4 , this probability is generally not negligible for natural images. Assume that each bit in {b(i)} yields balanced distribute over {0, 1}, we have . The relationship between P rob[x(k) is correct] and p c is given in Fig. 11 .
2) Deriving µ from two consecutive chaotic states: With two consecutive chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1), the estimated value of the secret control parameter µ will be
. Due to the negative influence of quantization errors, generally µ k = µ. As known, chaotic maps are sensitive to noises in the initial condition, so an approximate value of µ will generate entirely different chaotic states after several iterations, which implies µ k can not be directly used instead of µ as the secret key. Fortunately, if | µ k − µ| is small enough, we can exhaustively search the neighborhood of µ k to find the right value of µ. Now let us study when | µ k − µ| will be small enough.
3) Search algorithm 1: Note that Seed1(k) = Seed2(k) is possible, so the search complexity should be 
D. The Combined Known-Plaintext Attack E. The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In the above discussion on known-plaintext attacks, we have mentioned some requirements of the known plain-images. By choosing only one plain-image satisfying the requirements, one can get the mask image f m , and the equivalent key {µ, x(i)} without more plain-images. 
, which denotes the probability that there are i pairs of swapped pixels, and p c = 1 − p se . The relation between P 1 and p c is given in Fig. 10 .
2) Deriving µ from Two Consecutive Chaotic States:
With two consecutive chaotic states, x(k) and x(k + 1), the estimated value of the secret control parameter µ will be
. Due to the negative influence of quantization errors, generally µ k = µ. As known, chaotic maps are sensitive to noise in the initial condition, so an approximate value of µ will generate completely different chaotic states after several iterations, which implies that µ k can not be directly used instead of µ as the secret key. Fortunately, if Now, the concern is when | µ k − µ| will be small enough to make the exhaustive search practical. In 24-bit fixed-point arithmetic, µ, x(k), and x(k + 1) all have 24 binary decimal bits, and the quantization error of x(k + 1) can be explained in the following equation:
where e x(k+1) = e x(k+1) · (1 − x(k)) + e x(k+1) ≤ e x(k+1) + e x(k+1) . Considering e x(k+1) , e x(k+1) < 2 −24 for floor/ceil quantization functions and e x(k+1) , e x(k+1) ≤ 2 −25 for the round function, e x(k+1) < 2 −23 is true in all cases. Then, the quantization error e µ k = µ − µ k can be estimated as follows:
.
which means the size of the neighborhood of µ k for exhaustive search is 2 n+3 . To make the search complexity practically small in real attacks, x(k + 1) ≥ 0.5 is suggested to derive µ, which occurs with a probability equal to 0.5.
Combining the above analyses, the final complexity of finding two correct consecutive chaotic states, x(k), x(k + 1), and the right value of µ, is
which is generally much smaller than the complexity of exhaustively searching all possible keys. As a reference value, when p c = 0.7, the complexity is about O 2
17.8
O 2 48 .
3) A Quick Algorithm to Guess the Two Random Seeds:
Following the above-discussed search process, the found correct chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1) will be close to x(0).
Considering the occurrence of two consecutive chaotic states larger than 0.5 as a Bernoulli experiment, the mathematical expectation of k will be 1 (0.5 × P 1 ) 2 = 4 P 2 1 [30] . This means that only tens of known plain-pixels 3 are enough for an attacker to break the chaotic map, which is a very desired feature for attackers. However, as an obvious disadvantage, the search complexity to guess the two random seeds is somewhat large. In fact, for each pixel-block, one can only test a few number of possible 2-value (and 1-value) combinations, not all. If this pixel-block looks not good for guessing the two random seeds, simply discard it and go to the next pixel-block.
Following such an idea, a quicker algorithm can be designed to find the two random seeds. In this quick-search algorithm, the found correct chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1) may be far from x(0), so the size of the mask image has to be much larger than 4 P 2
1
The quick-search algorithm is based on the following observation: the more the unswapped pixels there are in the kth pixel-block, the more the number of values in S 4 will be in {f m (16k + j)} as follows:
Then, the following is also true: the more the unswapped pixels there are in the k-th pixel-block, the more the number of the values in S 2 will be in f m (16k + j)
Therefore, assuming that there are n k pairs of unswapped pixels in the k-th pixel-block, the following fact is true: if n k is sufficiently large, the two most-occurring elements in
are the two values in S 2 , with a high probability. Then, when can one say that n k is sufficiently large? In totally 8 pairs of elements, the average number of pairs in S 2 is N (S 2 ) = n k + (8 − n k ) · p se , and the number of other pairs is N (S 2 ) = 8−N (S 2 ) = (8−n k )·(1−p se ). From a conservative point of view, let N (S 2 ) < N (S 2 ) 2 , which ensures that the average number of each value in S 2 is larger than the number of all other values in {0, · · · , 127}−S 2 , with a sufficiently high probability. Solving this inequality, one can
Based on the above analyses, the quick-search algorithm is described as follows:
, in which the number of values in S 4 is not less than 12;
• Step 2: generate a new sequence, f m (16k + j) , all of them should be enumerated as value1 and value2 in Step 3 to Step 5. In a real attack, some extra constraints can be added to further optimize the above algorithm for different mask images. The attack complexity of this quick-search algorithm is hard to theoretically analyzed, since the distribution of those values that are not in S 4 is generally unknown. Fortunately, experiments show that the complexity is much smaller than the one given above. In Fig.   11 , the performance of the quick-search algorithm is shown for the recovered plain-image f * Peppers , where different pixelblocks are used to extract the chaotic states. Note that more than forty pixel-blocks are eligible to be used to extract the correct chaotic states, and the three shown here are randomly chosen for demonstration.
In the following, it is theoretically studied as how much M N should be to guarantee the efficiency of the quick-search algorithm, which is determined by the occurrence probability that two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the requirements given in Step 1 and independent of each other. The probability that one pixel-block satisfies the requirements, which is denoted by P o , yields Eq. (19) . Then, for the occurrence probability that two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the requirements, which is denoted by P o2 , one can calculate that P o2 = P ≈ 0.02. This means that there will be two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the requirements in
pixel-blocks (about 800 pixels), from the probabilistic point of view. Therefore, the required size of the known plain-image should be larger than 800, which is even smaller than the size P o ≥ P rob S 4 = S 4 = P rob both Seed1(k) and Seed2(k) occur at least 3 times in f m (16k + j)
of a 30 × 30 image. Hence, the quick-search algorithm is very efficient to use for attacks.
4) Breaking the Chaotic Map with both f m and Q:
All the above-mentioned algorithms are based on only-one known plain-image. When more than one plain/cipher-image is known, the constructed swapping (0, 1)-matrix Q will be very useful to increase the efficiency of the attack. As already known, the mask image f m can be amended using the swapping information stored in Q. Since all amended elements in f m are also values in S 4 , it is obvious that the efficiency of the search algorithm for finding correct random seeds will be increased. In addition, the swapping matrix Q can be used to uniquely determine some bits in {b(24k + 16 + i)} 7 i=0 without checking f m (16k + 2i) ∈ S 4 and f m (16k + 2i + 1) ∈ S 4 .
Thus, the total complexity in finding a correct chaotic state will be less, and the attack will succeed faster.
When two or more plain-images and/or cipher-images are known, most swapped pixels can be successfully distinguished.
In this case, it is much easier to find a pixel-block of f m whose elements are all in S 4 , which means that Seed1(k), Seed2(k) can be quickly guessed by enumerating all values in S 4 , and all the 8 bits {b(24k + 16 + i)} 7 i=0 can be absolutely determined. This implies that the attack complexity is minimized to be the complexity of breaking RCES's weaker parent -CKBA [24] .
D. The Combined Known-Plaintext Attack
The above two known-plaintext attacks have their disadvantages: the first attack cannot decrypt the cipher-images larger than M N (the size of f m ), and the second one cannot decrypt all pixels before the position where the first correct chaotic state x(k) is found. One can combine them, however, to make a better known-plaintext attack without these disadvantages: use the first attack to decrypt the pixels before x(k) and then use the second attack to decrypt the others. Figure 12 
E. The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
Apparently, all the above three known-plaintext attacks can be extended to chosen-plaintext attacks.
For the first kind of known-plaintext attack, the chosenplaintext version can achieve much better recovery performance with a nearly-perfect mask image f m , by choosing only one plain-image whose pixels are all fixed to be the same gray value. Given such a plain-image, from Corollary 1, any recovered plain-pixel will be the plain-pixel itself or its adjacent pixel. Thus, although the recovery error induced by a 1 = f 1 (16k + 2i) ⊕ f 1 (16k + 2i + 1) may still be large, it is expected that the visual quality of the recovered plainimage will be much better. It is also expected that all saltpepper impulsive noises will disappear and a dithering effect of edges will occur, which is demonstrated in Fig. 13c with the plain-image f * Peppers recovered from the chosen plain-image shown in Fig. 13a . As a natural result, the visual quality of the recovered plain-image f * Peppers becomes much better as compared with the one shown in Fig. 5a .
Similarly to the known-plaintext attack, with some image processing techniques, the recovered plain-image in the chosen-plaintext attack can also be enhanced to further provide a better visual quality. Now, the question is: can one maximize the visual quality with an optimization algorithm? The answer is yes. In fact, with a subtly-designed algorithm, almost all dithering edges can be perfectly polished and a matrix Q 
4) set the corresponding elements of the swapping matrix Q to be 1 for b s (i) = 1.
The complexity of the above algorithm is O(2 n · M N ). When M = N = 256 and n = 8, it is less than 2 24 , which is practical even on PCs.
For the recovered plain-image f * Peppers shown in Fig. 13c , the above algorithm has been tested with parameter n = 8, and the result is given in Figs. 14a and 
A. Principle 1: Security against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks should be provided
As surveyed in [2] , besides CKBA/RCES, many other image encryption schemes are also insecure against the known/chosen-plaintext attack. However, without the capability against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks, it will be insecure to repeatedly use the same secret key to encrypt multiple image files. When the cryptosystems are used to encrypt image streams transmitted over networks, this problem can be relaxed due to the use of time-variant session keys [27] . Considering that most image encryption systems are proposed to encrypt local image files, the security against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks is generally required.
B. Principle 2: Do not use invertible encryption function
Rewrite the encryption function of a symmetric cipher as C = E(P, K). The function E(·, ·) is said to be invertible, if K can be derived from C and P with its inverse function E −1 (·, ·), i.e., K = E −1 (P, C). Most modern ciphers employs a mixture of operations defined in different groups to make the encryption function non-invertible. 4 For more discussions on how to design a good image encryption schemes, see Sec. 4.5 of [2] .
In RCES/CKBA, the encryption function is XOR, which is an invertible operation since P ⊕ K = C ⇒ K = P ⊕ C. It is the essential reason why the mask image f m can be used as an equivalent of the real key (x(0), µ). Similarly, the invertibility of the swapping operations is the reason for the success of the dithering-removal algorithm discussed in the chosen-plaintext attack.
To enhance the security of RCES, the XOR operation can be replaced with some key-dependent invertible functions.
Another way is to replace the swapping operation with more complex long-distance permutation operations, such as the ones used in [9] - [12] . If both operations are changed as above, the security will be further enhanced. References [9] - [12] suggest some typical image ciphers that use such an idea to ensure the security against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
C. Principle 3: The correlation information within the plainimage should be sufficiently reduced
As shown in the previous section, the high correlation information between adjacent pixels is an important reason of the good performances for the known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
In fact, there exists a large amount of correlation information within digital images, even between pixels whose distances are large, such as pixels in a smooth area. To provide sufficient security against attacks, the correlation information within the plain-image should be sufficiently concealed. A typical method to conceal the correlation information is to carry out complex long-distance permutation operations [9] - [12] . Note that the long-distance permutations are not necessary conditions, but sufficient ones, since any secure text cipher can also provide enough security for digital images.
D. Principle 4: Any non-uniformity existing in the cipherimages should be avoided
From a cryptographer's point of view, any non-uniformity is not welcome due to the risk of causing statistics-based attacks, such as the well-known differential attacks [27] . So, it should be carefully checked whether or not there exists any nonuniformity in the ciphertexts.
The essential reason for the insecurity of RCES/CKBA against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks can also be ascribed to the non-uniformity of the distribution of f (l) ⊕ f (l) over {0, · · · , 255}:
• for any unswapped pixel, P rob[f (l)⊕f (l) = Seed(l)] = 1, i.e., the distribution is one with the most nonuniformity;
• for any swapped pixel, the distribution of f (l)⊕f (l) has the same non-uniformity level as the one of f (l)⊕f (l+1) (see the distribution of f
Peppers shown in Fig. 6 ). This also suggests that all pixels should be permuted.
Actually, in the second known-plaintext attack, the feasibility of the quick-search algorithm in finding the two random seeds is benefited from the non-uniformity of the distribution of f m (16k + j) 15 j=0 over the discrete set {0, · · · , 127}. If each f m (16k + j) distributes uniformly over {0, · · · , 127}, the exhaustive search algorithm will be practically impossible when the block size is changed to a sufficiently large value.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, it has been pointed out that the RCES/RSES image encryption method recently proposed in [17] , [18] is not secure enough against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks, and that the security against brute-force attack was overestimated.
Both theoretical and experimental analyses have been given to support the feasibility of the known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
The insecurity of RCES are caused by a careless design, and some principles on good design of secure image encryption schemes can be learned from the weakness of RCES. In summary, although RCES cannot be used in practice as a secure cipher to protect digital images, it provides a typical example for caution. University for her comments on part of the theoretical analyses of the designed attacks presented in this paper.
